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1.  Introduction 
 
Since 2002, the negotiations on EPAs are slowly moving forward. At the start of 2007, with 
only one year to go, progress towards an agreement seemed to have come to a standstill. 
Then, in the early Spring 2007, with less than one year to go before the lapse of the old-style 
Lomé preferences, the EU offered the ACP groups full Duty-free and Quota-free (DFQF) 
access to the EU market (Commission 2007b). This would fully apply from 1 January 2008, 
as part of signed EPAs. A few weeks earlier, the Commission had made it clear that: ‘If we 
fail to put a new system in place we would have to fall back on the only legal alternative 
which is the EU’s existing Generalised System of Preferences: this is tariff only with less 
generous access than under Cotonou for many and no economic governance framework.’ 
(Commission 2007a) Thus, the EU puts the ACP before a clear choice: DFQF under EPAs or 
the GSP. A compromise such as a renewal of the waiver for the Cotonou non-reciprocal 
preferences is rejected in the same memo.  
In the same weeks, the pressure on some African ACP countries to decide on the 
question in which regional grouping they will participate, has been on the increase. As 
COMESA is working towards the introduction of a customs union (CU) at 1 January 2008 
and SADC has the same plan for 2010, Tanzania and Zambia will have to choose, as an 
economy can shift the powers on trade policy to a common institution only once. (Tralac 
newsletter, 3 April 2007) Thus, economic integration and EPA negotiations seem to be 
moving in a parallel way. The same applies for other configurations in SSA.  
 
The result of this parallel movement will be, if completed successfully, that all or almost all 
SSA economies will be in CUs in the coming years, while these CUs have concluded Free 
Trade Areas with the EU. Many relevant questions can be asked.  
First, the EU has always maintained that EPAs are an instrument to promote regional 
integration among ACP countries. Have EPA negotiations produced this result? 
Second, CUs among SSA economies will harmonize different kinds of regulatory 
policies. As the EU will insist on the inclusion of many regulatory areas in the EPAs 
(competition policy, investment regulation, government procurement) one may assume, that 
there will be an upgrading of regulatory issues in the direction of the EU levels. EPAs will 
develop into regulatory unions. How does this relate to the regulatory systems of other trade 
powers, the US and China? 
Third, how are the US policies towards SSA affected by EPAs? There are various 
effects. One may hypothesize that EPAs will lead to the situation that all economies of the 
region will be in one CU. Parts of their economic policies will be shifted to common 
institutions (see first question). This will impact upon AGOA, as this non-reciprocal system 
works in a bilateral way with individual countries. The conditionality of AGOA is partly 
economic and partly political. It will be difficult to shift these conditions for AGOA to the 
level of the CUs, while keeping it on the purely bilateral level is not working any longer.  
Fourth, the EU will gradually get preferential access to the markets of the ACP. The 
US has up to now refrained from concluding FTAs with SSA economies (Lesage and 
Kerremans 2007). In combination with question three, one may assume that there is a growing 
incentive for the US to start negotiations for FTAs with SSA economies. Given the existence 
of EPAs and regional groupings, a US version of EPAs might be expected.   
The paper is composed as follows. In the second section we will briefly indicate the 
background of the EPA negotiations and their projected outcome. We will analyze the link 
between the coming EPAs and regional integration in section three. The question of how 
EPAs will impact upon the relationship between selected SSA countries and AGOA will be 
discussed in section four. In section five we draw conclusions and summarize the main 
findings.   
 
 
2.  The ideas behind EPAs and regional integration in SSA 
 
The benefits of regional integration among SSA economies have been extensively described 
and analyzed. The creation of bigger and more competitive markets, the improvement of 
connecting infrastructure, making regulation and meeting regulatory conditions of export 
markets cheaper by sharing cost, providing an anchor against narrow protectionist pressure 
groups are among the most mentioned economic benefits. There are important political 
benefits to be gained as well. In terms of regional political stability, regional integration may 
serve as a security institution of last instance. In a more peaceful setting, regional integration 
bodies may be more effective in international negotiations than small poor nations are.  
 
Table 1 
Intra-trade of regional integration organizations in Sub Saharan Africa, 1980 to 2004, in 
million US dollars.  
          
Trade group  1980  1990 1995 2000 2003 2004 
          
COMESA   555  889 1025 1266 1978 2619 
ECOWAS   661  1532 1875 2715 2972 3910 
UEMOA   460  621 560 741 1043 1370 
SADC   108  1058 4124 4280 4967 6007 
CEMAC   75  139 120 101 157 206 
          
Source: UNCTAD (2005) Handbook of Statistics 2005, New York and Geneva: 
UNCTAD 
 
 
 
Table 2   
Intra-trade of regional integration organizations in Sub Saharan Africa, 1980 to 2004, as 
a percentage of total trade  
          
Trade group  1980  1990 1995 2000 2003 2004 
          
COMESA    5.7 6.3 6.0 4.9 6.2 6.3 
ECOWAS    9.6 8.0 9.0 7.6 8.3 8.2 
UEMOA    9.6  13.0 10.3 13.1 13.0 14.2 
SADC    0.4 3.1 10.6  9.3 9.1 8.8 
CEMAC    1.6 2.3 2.1 1.0 1.4 1.3 
          
Source: UNCTAD (2005) Handbook of Statistics 2005, New York and Geneva: 
UNCTAD 
 
  
This paper mainly analyses economic integration in SSA, although we are aware of the fact 
that political stability is often a crucial condition for successful integration.  
  Economic integration in Africa has a long history. Some integration bodies have their 
origins in the early 20
th century (SACU), while most of them started in 1960s. Although most 
of these organizations have been equipped with working governing bodies and secretariats, 
‘regional integration has been broadly perceived as having produced few concrete results – 
despite considerable rhetoric and protracted efforts by governments, institutions and other 
players.’ (Economic Commission for Africa 2004: 30) this is visible from the low levels of 
intra-trade among the member states of different integration bodies. Although there has been 
an increase in the absolute levels of trade among these members (table 1), this growth was 
generally more or less equal to their trade to all destinations (table 2).  
The main reasons for these disappointing results are, first, a lack of political 
commitment to implement the agreed measures to liberalize intra-trade, harmonize economic 
policies and provide the common institutions with sufficient financial resources. The second 
reason is the extensive overlapping membership that produces a waste of scarce human and 
financial resources, besides being a symptom of lacking political commitment as well. 
(Martin, 1992, Faber 2005). And third, domestic institutions do not have the capacity to give 
sufficient technical and analytical support and to provide information to a wider public on the 
benefits of integration. (Economic Commission for Africa 2004)  
 
The Cotonou Agreement has the objective to promote regional integration among the ACP 
group. developing countries. Art. 20 stipulates that ‘ACP-EC cooperation strategies shall aim 
at (..) achieving rapid and sustained job-creating economic growth, developing the private 
sector, increasing employment, improving access to productive economic activities and 
resource, and fostering regional cooperation and integration. The objective of regional 
integration has an important implication on the cooperation measures in general and on the 
economic and trade cooperation in particular. The latter ‘shall build on regional integration 
initiatives of ACP States, bearing in mind that regional integration is a key instrument for the 
integration of ACP countries into the world economy’, according to article 35. The 
preparatory period for EPAs (2000-2008) should be used for reinforcing the regional 
integration among ACP countries, by capacity-building in the public and private sectors, for 
strengthening of regional organisations and for support to regional trade integration 
initiatives, ‘where appropriate with assistance to budgetary adjustment and fiscal reform, as 
well as for infrastructure upgrading and development, and for investment promotion’(art. 37).  
  It is clear from the Cotonou Agreement that fostering regional integration is an 
important challenge for the transition period up to 2008 and beyond. What would be the most 
logic construction of an EPA? These reciprocal trade agreements are concluded by a group of 
ACP countries at the one hand, and the EU at the other hand. The EU has a unified position in 
the negotiations and in the trade policy measures it wants to incorporate in the EPA. The ACP 
group has two options: concluding an EPA that includes a single market access arrangement 
to the EU market and a separate arrangement for EU access to every member of the ACP 
regional group. The second option would be a common position by the regional ACP group, 
thus in fact operating as a CU. The first option has a number of disadvantages: first, it does 
not promote regional integration in the ACP group as it requires border controls in the intra-
trade of the group to enforce the special arrangements each member has with the under the 
EPA. Second, the ACP members will weaken their negotiating positions by trying to get 
‘concessions’ from the EU on an individual basis. Thus, the EPA negotiating process itself 
has in built incentives to create CUs in ACP regional groups. The next section will try to find 
out whether this has indeed happened in SSA.   
3. The EPA negotiating process and regional integration in SSA 
 
 
3.1 West Africa 
 
In West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is the 
negotiating partner of the EU. ECOWAS was established in 1975, with the objective of 
creating a full economic and monetary union in order to become more self-reliant. In a report 
on the occasion of the 25
th anniversary of the Community, the secretariat remarks that 
progress has been made in a number of areas (including the movement of persons and the 
construction of interstate roads). However, ‘it is in the area of the integration of markets that 
the efforts of the Community have been frustrating. In fact, the trade liberalisation scheme is 
not yet operational as shown by the low level of the intraregional trade, which is only 11% as 
compared to trade with third countries. Besides, the common ECOWAS external tariff has 
still not seen the light of day and the economic and financial policies have not been 
harmonised although a framework has been established for this.’ (Commission of ECOWAS 
2000) Common customs documents and tariff reductions were not introduced by many 
member states, although it had been agreed to have abolished all internal tariff barriers at the 
end of 1999, in order to create an FTA. In a next phase of two years, a CET would be put in 
place.   
The market integration in ECOWAS builds on the more progressed integration among 
a subset of its members that constitute the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(UEMOA). These eight French-speaking African states share a common currency (the CFA 
franc that has a fixed exchange rate with the Euro and is supported by the French treasury), 
have introduced a CET and a larger degree of internal free trade than ECOWAS. (Agritrade 
august 2006)   Although the implementation of the CET is not yet completed, UEMOA is 
clearly on the road to the implementation of a CU. The objective to create a CU in ECOWAS 
was given an impulse by the Heads of State of ECOWAS in January 2006 to introduce a CET 
based on the UEMO CET (put in place in 2000 in the Union). The CET has to be in function 
from 1 January 2008 onwards, the date on which an EPA will have to replace the former 
preferential regime.
1 Until that date, member states may derogate from the CET for particular 
(‘list A’) products. Member states are also in a position to create exceptions that stretch 
beyond the transitional period for a change of tariff band for particular products (‘list B’).  
The CET as decided in 2006 has four tariff bands. A zero band for ‘essential products of a 
social nature’; a 5 per cent band for ‘essential products such as basic raw materials, capital 
goods and specific inputs’; a 10 per cent band for other inputs and intermediate products and a 
20 per cent band for finished consumer goods. It has been reported that Nigeria would like to 
create a new tariff band of 50 per cent for sensitive products. (Agritrade August 2006) The 
internal trade liberalization in ECOWAS started as early as 1981 for unprocessed goods and 
handicrafts. Before 2000, tariffs on industrial products should have been broken down. This 
was not realized. Only recently the process was revitalized. EUMOA members have made 
much more progress in internal trade liberalization. The creation of a FTA was realized. (ECA 
2004)  
 
On the basis of this review of economic integration in West Africa we draw the conclusion 
that there is progress in the integration process. The progress that UEMOA made is spilling 
                                                 
1 According to the roadmap agreed in August 2004 between the delegation of West Africa and the EU on the 
negotiating process, this decision should have been taken one year earlier.  over to the other ECOWAS members as far as the establishment of a CU is concerned.
2 At the 
same time, the integration process is vulnerable. The position of Mauritania is not clear: as 
member of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) it might run into problems as member of the 
West Africa EU EPA. The transition period to the CET shows that some member states want 
substantial exceptions for their sensitive products, which undermines the idea of a CET.  
Have EPA negotiations promoted regional integration in West Africa? The timing of 
the progress does not contradict a positive answer to this question: at the end of the 20
th 
century, ECOWAS integration was stagnating or backsliding; in 2006/07 progress has clearly 
been made towards a CU in West Africa. The EU-West Africa roadmap adopted in August 
2004 recorded the agreement to move towards a CU and led to the decision of ECOWAS 
members to adopt a CET and to take other measures in the area of reducing trade costs 
between the members.  
 
3.2 Central Africa 
 
The Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC) is the partner for the EU to 
establish a Central African-EU EPA.  CEMAC was established in 1994 as the successor to the 
Union Douanière et Économique de l’Afrique Centrale (UDEAC). CEMAC came into force 
in 1999 with the objective to overcome the shortcomings of the UDEAC, viz. the arrears in 
the payments of contribution by the member states to finance the common institutions and its 
activities and the non-implementation of decisions. One of the objectives of the new Union is 
to create a Common Market. During the first five years, the institutions of the union have 
been reinforced; an FTA is officially working since 2000 and the CET (formally introduced in 
1993) has been reformed in 2001 and 2002 leading to a CU.  The CET counts four tariff 
bands: a 5 per cent band for ‘essential goods’; equipment and raw materials fall into a 10 per 
cent band; intermediate goods are levied in the 20 per cent band while general consumer 
goods face a 30 tariff. (Economic Commission for Africa 2004) Despite this progress, there 
are risks of stagnation, or even backsliding. In the Technical Negotiating Group on Customs 
Procedures, EPA negotiators of the EU and the CEMAC discuss regional integration as far as 
customs are concerned. In March 2005, CEMAC brought forward some of the problems it has 
in the application of its CET, ‘especially in relation to the many derogations permitted’ (Trade 
Negotiations Insights 2005:6). One year earlier, the Council of Ministers of CEMAC had 
presented a mixed evaluation of the realization of the objectives over the first five years. In a 
report on the matter, the CEMAC Executive Secretariat wrote: ‘The infringements on the 
application of the customs laws and regulations, the tariff and non-tariff barriers to internal 
trade, the insufficient observation of the rules of origin and of the common decisions with 
respect to competition constitute dangerous deviations that could, all things considered, drag 
the whole edifice under construction to its breakdown.’ (cited in ECDPM and Performances 
2006: 21, translation by the authors) In 2006, the Council of Ministers decided to start a 
reform process in order to reinforce the integration process. A year later, the Council decided 
to introduce free movement of goods and services by 2009. Gabon and Equatorial Guinea 
asked more time for this.  
  The integration process in CEMAC has produced a CU that looks strong on paper, but 
has shortcomings in its implementation. The countries are united in a Monetary Union that 
dates back to colonial times. It could be argued that the monetary integration provides a basis 
for the other aspects of integration. However, it has turned out to be insufficient to guarantee a 
smooth phase in of a CU that is crucial for an effective EPA. The opposite may even be more 
to the point: monetary integration might make a CU more difficult to realize as exchange rate 
                                                 
2 In the area of monetary integration it less clear whether the UEMOA example will be repeated in the rest of 
ECOWAS.  changes are not available to cushion the restructuring of domestic economies after the 
introduction of trade liberalization. We conclude that without the EPA negotiating process the 
sense of urgency to reinforce CEMAC probably would have been less. Having said that, it is 
clear that a well-functioning EPA will require a stronger CEMAC than it is today.  
 
 
3.3 East and South Africa 
 
The EPA partner in East and South Africa is the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA). This CM is the successor to the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and 
Southern Africa that was established in 1981 in the period when African continental 
integration was considered the long-term goal of the regional integration efforts. The central 
aim of COMESA is to facilitate its member states to attain ‘collective and sustained 
development’. This is to be realized by first creating an FTA for goods and services. A CU, 
CM and finally a Monetary Union were planned for the future. COMESA has 19 member 
states.
3 Not all member states participate in the EPA negotiations with the EU. Egypt and 
Libya do not belong to the ACP group and Egypt has its own reciprocal free trade agreement 
with the EU. Angola and Swaziland are in the SADC negotiating group (see next subsection) 
while the Democratic Republic of Congo is participating in the CEMAC group.  
  The COMESA FTA should have been realized in 2000 according to the time schedule. 
For nine member states this was indeed the case (Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe). Burundi and Rwanda joined in 2004. 
Comoros, Eritrea and Uganda have reduced their tariffs on intra-COMESA trade by 80 per 
cent at the time of writing. Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (both zero reduction) 
and Ethiopia (10 per cent reduction) are de facto not in the FTA.
4  COMESA will move 
towards a CU by introducing a CET in 2008 (although this had been planned for 2004 at an 
earlier stage). The CET planned for 2004 consists of four bands: zero for capital goods, 5 per 
cent on raw materials, 15 per cent on intermediate goods and 30 per cent on final goods. 
(ECA 2004) In 2005, COMESA reported that negotiations were taking place on a 
convergence plan to move the common tariffs and the identification of sensitive products and 
exemptions.  
  It is generally acknowledged that COMESA is the integration body in SSA that has 
made most progress. (ECDPM 2006) There is a strong core of members that applies the FTA. 
However, the formulation and introduction of the CET is a difficult process. The introduction 
has been postponed now to 2008. COMESA has built a negotiating structure that is preparing 
common positions for external negotiations relatively effectively. One of the problems that 
COMESA members have to solve is the overlapping membership. Kenya and Uganda are also 
members of the East African Community (EAC, of which Tanzania is the third member). The 
EAC plans to introduce a CU with a CET in the same time frame as COMESA. Egypt and 
Libya are in the planned EU-Mediterranean FTA that will merge the separate agreements 
between the EU and Mediterranean countries. This overlapping membership complicates the 
introduction of a CU and a CM by COMESA, as a country can be a member of only one CU. 
As progress is made towards a CU in COMESA, and EPA negotiations between the EU and 
COMESA have agreed to complete the negotiations by the end of 2007, pressure to opt for 
one integration body is increasing on the double membership countries. Given the positions of 
                                                 
3 COMESA has seen its membership change over time. Tanzania stepped out at the end on the 90s while Angola 
and Namibia left the CM rather recently (checken). The club was joined by Egypt and Libya in  
4 Swaziland has a derogation pending the concurrence of the SACU; Libya is not mentioned in the report on the 
state of affairs of the FTA in COMESA. Although Angola is mentioned in the FTA report, it is not in the official 
list of member countries (see, e.g. COMESA 2006).  Kenya and Uganda in the ESA negotiations and the size of the COMESA compared to the 
EAC, it may be expected that these countries opt for COMESA. This will merge EAC with 
COMESA and force Tanzania to choose between SADC and COMESA.  Our conclusion is, 
that the EPA process has supported the process of integration in COMESA; the most visible 
aspect of this is the pressure to end the overlapping memberships.   
 
 
3.4 Southern African Development Community 
 
ACP countries in Southern Africa are negotiating with the EU in a group that consists of a 
part of the membership of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This 
Community is the successor to the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC). The SADC members decided to start economic integration among themselves by 
adopting the SADC Trade Protocol in 1996 that became operational in 2000. According to 
this agreement, an FTA should be in place in 2008. It has been proposed to expand the FTA 
into a CU by 2010 and a CM by 2015. Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and 
Swaziland are highly integrated in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). There are 
no tariffs on intra-SACU trade and the CET is South Africa’s external tariff. South Africa 
concluded a free trade agreement with the EU in 2000. The rest of SACU was drawn into this 
FTA without much discussion. If SADC will indeed establish a CU, a harmonisation towards 
the SACU will have to be introduced. The other members in the SADC negotiating group are 
Mozambique, Angola and Tanzania. South Africa had observer status in the EPA 
negotiations; the country became one of the negotiating countries in 2006.
5  
  The SADC Trade Protocol applies for the trade between all SADC members except 
Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Outside SACU, the level of trade integration 
is limited, as several members have not lived up to the tariff reduction schedules. Some very 
important products have been excluded from liberalisation, bringing the volume of goods that 
are excluded from the FTA at more than the agreed 15 per cent. (ECDPM 2006b). Non-SACU 
members offer more favourable access to imports from Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland than to imports from South Africa. South Africa will abolish all tariffs on intra-
SADC trade in 1012.   
The relationship between the EPA negotiations and the SADC integration process is 
rather complex, for several reasons. First, the SADC negotiating group for an EPA does not 
coincide with the members of the SADC Trade Protocol.  Second, the members of the SADC 
Trade Protocol have different relations with the EU: SACU members are in a de facto FTA 
with the EU already; least developed members have the (non-reciprocal) option of Everything 
but Arms while some others are negotiating on an EPA in the ESA group (Malawi, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Zambia, Zimbabwe) or in the CEMAC group (Democratic Republic 
of Congo). Third, the integration in the SADC area is far away from a CU, given the problems 
to complete the SADC FTA. Still, the EU favours the introduction of a CU before the EPA is 
signed. (ECDPM 2006c) This touches upon the common positions that the negotiating group 
will have to formulate. Up to now, the proposals by the SADC group were defensive: EBA 
access in the EU, and continuation of the status quo as far as market access for the EU in the 
SADC is concerned. This position does not imply continued integration among the SADC.  
The EU offer of EBA access in all EPAs has taken away only part of the complications, as the 
offer does not apply for South Africa. Perhaps most important, this offer has increased the 
stakes for the negotiating countries (except of course for South Africa) to arrive at an EPA. It 
                                                 
5 This leaves the following members of  SADC in other EPA groups:  Democratic Republic of Congo (CEMAC), 
Madagascar (ESA, SADC membership pending) , Seychelles (ESA),  Zambia (ESA) and Zimbabwe (ESA). 
 is probable that the EU will only accept an EPA that is reciprocal, for reasons of WTO 
compatibility. This will force the SADC negotiating group to come up with proposals that are 
based on common positions with respect to, e.g., the timing of preferential tariff reductions on 
EU products and the list of goods to be excluded from tariff reductions. The risk that each 
SADC member drafts its own list of sensitive products, implying the continuation of internal 
border controls in SADC to the detriment of integration (Stevens 2006), would be reduced. 
This mirrors the difficulties that the SADC Trade Protocol encounters in creating its internal 
FTA: the exclusions from free circulation that many member states have made for different 
products. In this way, EPA negotiations have been a catalyst for the progress of regional 
integration in the Southern Africa, although it is not certain whether the impact is sufficient to 
overcome the counter forces for integration. A second effect will be, that overlapping 
membership will become impossible. In the end, when ESA (COMESA) and CEMAC have 
become functioning CUs, SADC members will have to put their eggs in one basket. This will 
reduce one of the major barriers for SSA economic integration. 
  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
  
This section has given an overview of the regional integration in SSA and tried to answer the 
question whether the EPA negotiations have stimulated the regional integration on the 
continent. For ECOWAS, we noted that the timing of progress ran parallel with the EPA 
negotiations. The EU-West Africa roadmap adopted in August 2004 recorded the agreement 
to move towards a CU and led to the decision of ECOWAS members to adopt a CET and to 
take other measures in the area of reducing trade costs between the members. In the case of 
CEMAC, without the EPA negotiating process the sense of urgency to reinforce CEMAC 
probably would have been less. COMESA has been making progress in economic integration 
in the last ten years. The EPA process has supported the process of integration in COMESA; 
the most visible aspect of this is the pressure to end the overlapping memberships. The SADC 
negotiating group has started its regional integration process rather recently (in 2000), 
although a subset is in the world’s oldest CU (SACU). Regional free trade is still hampered by 
many exemptions. EPA negotiations have stalled for long periods. The EPA process has 
increased the stakes for the participating SSA countries to formulate a strategy for a working 
FTA and to abolish overlapping memberships.  
The EPA negotiating process has given stimuli for regional integration in SSA. This 
does not mean that, once an EPA is in place, all SSA countries will be in well-functioning 
regional CUs. The different integration bodies are in different stages of working towards a 
CU. In COMESA the prospect of a CU has been embedded in the policy making of the 
member states. For SADC, there is a rather long way to go.    
However, a parallel force has been at work in Africa for some time now, arguably 
even before the Cotonou Agreement entered to force in 2000, purposely to encourage further 
regional integration across Africa. First, in mid-1991, members of the defunct Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) signed a treaty in Abuja, Nigeria, pointedly to facilitate regional 
integration on the continent and achieve an African Economic Community (AEC) by 2031.
6 
A key component of the strategy was to pursue regional integration via sub-continental 
regional integration schemes, and to do so over a 34-40-year period. This effort was 
subsequently followed a little over a decade later by the inauguration of the African Union 
(AU), the successor to the OAU, to promote continental integration by strengthening regional 
                                                 
6 http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/oau/treaties/AEC_Treaty_1991.pdfintegration at the sub-continental level. To that end, the mid-2002 Constitutive Act of the AU 
called on member countries to participate in sub-continental regional integration groupings. 
The Constitutive Act further encouraged the strengthening of sub-continental regional 
integration arrangements where they already existed, and that they should created if 
otherwise.
7 In a sense, therefore, efforts by African leaders to strengthen regional integration 
across the African continent, nicely complements the strategy of the European Commission 
via the EPAs. 
 
 
4. SSA regional integration and AGOA 
 
 
In this section, we will discuss the broad implications of what successful conclusions of EPAs 
and the advancement of regional integration (RI) by SSA’s sub-continental groups mean for 
the US and its AGOA initiative in SSA. In doing so, we will first provide an 
overview/background on the AGOA scheme as it appertains to promoting the development of 
SSA. We will then provide our analysis of what EPAs and RIs forebode for the AGOA 
initiative in the sub-continent. 
 
4.1 AGOA 
 
The AGOA was signed into law on 18 May 2000 by former US President Bill Clinton. In 
August 2002, the bill was re-enacted and signed into law by President George W. Bush as 
AGOA II, as it is widely known. Inter alia, the scheme provides duty and quota free access to 
over 1800 products, or to virtually all products from qualified SSA countries. 
In order for a SSA country to participate in AGOA, the country must first be certified 
by the US government according to the following criteria: market-based economy; protection 
of private property; limited government interference; political pluralism; rule of law; rules of 
the global trading order; poverty reduction policies; corruption-fighting programs; and the 
protection of minimum (child) labor standards. Moreover, the US will not certify any SSA 
country whose actions violate human rights, support global terrorism, or undermine US 
national security. 
Since its inception, various SSA countries have been certified, de-certified, and re-
certified for AGOA annually on the bases of the aforementioned criteria. According to a 
recent report by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), AGOA has 
bolstered trade and investment between the US and SSA. More specifically
8, US imports 
from SSA, under AGOA, increased by 55% to over $14 billion during the fist year of AGOA, 
and US direct investment in SSA increased modestly by 12% to almost $9 billion between 
2002 and 2003. In Lesotho, for instance, and consequent to the AGOA, roughly 25,000 jobs 
were created, 13 new factories were inaugurated, and over $170 million were mobilized for 
the construction of special fabric mills. Additionally, exports from Lesotho to the US 
increased by 50 per cent in value from $197 million to $297 million between 2001 and 2002.
9
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/oau/treaties/Constit_Act_of_AU_2000.pdf,  
8 “2004 Comprehensive Report on US Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act” (USTR, May 2004) 
9 www.lndc.org.ls4.3 Impact on AGOA   
 
To recapitulate, EPAs are partnership agreements between the EU on the one hand, and sub-
sets of ACP countries on the other, and must be in place by the beginning of 2008. The intent 
is to help the ACP countries develop their supply capacity via RI schemes (by pooling their 
scarce resources) at the sub-group level, in the hopes of facilitating the integrations of the 
ACP economies into the global economy. Likewise, the AGOA is a bilateral preferential 
access initiative that the US government has extended to qualified SSA countries (according 
to US terms and conditions), in the hopes of using the twin engines of trade and investment to 
stimulate the development of SSA. If, as reported by some studies (e.g., Babarinde and Faber, 
in Faber and Orbie, 2007) and as discussed above, the AGOA scheme is paying dividends for 
participating SSA countries, and given that ACP countries are intensifying their RI, as 
encouraged in the Cotonou Agreement, and as also encouraged by the Consultative Act of the 
African Union treaty, how then will US’s development initiative in SSA— the AGOA— be 
affected by the imminent launch of the EU’s EPAs? 
On the one hand, the eligibility conditionalities/criteria of AGOA bodes well for SSA, 
because they demand of SSA countries to either establish or be making progress toward 
establishing a market-oriented economy, a rule-of-law-based society, a pluralist polity, and 
good governance. As long as individual SSA countries qualify for the AGOA, it is safe to 
conclude that they must be heading in the right direction, and other things being equal, their 
exports and inward FDI must be attractive. From this point of view, AGOA ultimately 
complements the aspirations of the EPAs and the RI schemes. Put differently, the 
development goals of the EU’s EPAs/RIs are coterminous with those of the US and the 
AGOA. 
On the other hand, however, if the EPAs and the AU/AEC are successful at 
intensifying RI in SSA among its constituent members in the manner of establishing CUs, 
CMs, and even EMUs, the carrot and stick underpinning of the AGOA may be in jeopardy 
and become untenable. The reason is simply because AGOA has a bilateral logic to it, while 
RI schemes like a CU, a CM, or an EMU imply the increasing coordination of economic 
policy and possibly the adoption of common policies (e.g., a CET) at the sub-
continental/supra-national level. To the extent that the AGOA is designed to foster the 
development of SSA via exports and inward FDI, and if the AU/AEC are already expanding 
the economic space at the sub-continental level, then the pressure will mount on the US 
government to either discontinue the AGOA scheme, or recast it, such that it now deals with 
(i.e., certifies, de-certifies, or re-certifies) RI groups, rather than individual SSA country. 
While the former option seems rather harsh, it may be the better of the two, especially given 
the practical implications/difficulties of the latter. Specifically, how would the US 
government use its litany of criteria to certify, de-certify, or re-certify a group of countries, no 
matter how small the size? This will amount to a daunting challenge, particularly if, say, only 
one/few of its members veritably merit/warrant (de)certification. The prospect of withdrawing 
AGOA preferences from a group of CU or CM countries may not be quite appealing under 
any circumstance. It could also be counterproductive for US business/investment interests. 
Besides, group (de)certification is beyond the mandate of the statute that created AGOA, and 
congressional action may be required to amend the statute, which is unlikely under the current 
political climate in Washington, DC, and during the waning years of a sitting duck President. 
 
In any event, the pressure on the US government will likely mount to transform the AGOA. 
Perhaps a third plausible option is for the US to float its own FTA initiative with SSA by 
negotiating with SSA’s sub-groups. The agreements will be compatible with the WTO rules, 
and they are likely to result in a win-win situation for the US government, which has always been the cornerstone of its development strategy in SSA. Besides, this idea is not without 
precedence, because in 2003, the US government commenced talks with the SACU about a 
FTA. Talks are presently suspended indefinitely. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
The Cotonou Agreement announced the transition to a new trade arrangement between the 
ACP group and the EU. Reciprocal FTAs (labelled Economic Partnership Agreements or 
EPAs) with subgroups of ACP economies are the preferred option of the Agreement. 
Promotion of regional integration is a clear objective of the Cotonou Agreement. EPAs are to 
be built on these regional FTAs and CUs. This paper first answers the question whether 
regional integration has progressed under the influence of the EPA negotiating process. We 
find that the EPA negotiating process has indeed given stimuli for regional integration in 
SSA. Most visible aspects are the progress towards common external tariffs and the 
unavoidable ending of overlapping memberships. At the same time we noted that the 
integration process in SSA is vulnerable for internal and external shocks. EPAs could best be 
built on regional CUs. The different integration bodies are in different stages of working 
towards a CU. The regional integration effort is also supported by continental integration 
plans, embodied in the African Union.  
The second question that the paper addresses is how the SSA/US relationships under the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) will evolve, under the assumption that   
regional integration in SSA is successful. Although AGOA ultimately complements the 
aspirations of the EPAs and the regional integration schemes, in that both work through 
liberalisation of markets, tensions will arise. The reason is, that AGOA has a strong bilateral 
flavour in its conditionality and preferential treatment while the regional integration systems 
imply the increasing coordination of economic policy and possibly the adoption of common 
policies (e.g., a CET) at the sub-continental/supra-national level. The US government will be 
under rising pressure to either discontinue the AGOA scheme, or recast it, such that it would 
deal with CUs instead of individual countries. As it is impracticable and counterproductive to 
withdraw AGOA preferences from a CU if one or a few members do not satisfy the AGOA 
conditionality, the US might consider to float its own FTA initiative with SSA sub-groups. 
These groups will be the CUs that already have an EPA with the EU. This result of the EPA 
introduction will not only lower trade diversion effects of the regional CUs and the EPAs, it 
will also constitute an unexpected strong realization of the objective of regional integration 
among ACP countries as formulated in the Cotonou Agreement.  
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